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FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES - WITH LIBERTY AND
JUSTICE FOR ALL... UNLESS YOU CHOOSE TO FLY:
TORBET V. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.
DEBoRAH LAWSON*
N TORBET v. United Airlines, Inc.,' the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed a California district court,2 holding that "the
Fourth Amendment permits a random search, at an airport se-
curity checkpoint, of a carry-on bag that has passed through an
x-ray scan without arousing suspicion that the bag contains
weapons or explosives."' Continued erosion of the Fourth
Amendment's protection from "unreasonable searches and
seizures " 4 is resulting in a return to the general warrant searches
that the Fourth Amendment was designed to combat. The
Ninth Circuit ignored the prophetic warning, "[h]istory reveals
that the initial steps in the erosion of individual rights are usu-
ally excused on the basis of an 'emergency' or threat to the pub-
lic. But the ultimate strength of our constitutional guarantees
lies in their unhesitating application in times of crisis and tran-
quility alike."5 A random, physical search of a passenger's carry-
on bag, following an x-ray scan that did not raise suspicion is
unconstitutional because the random, physical search is unrea-
sonable, the procedures are unknown, and consent is not given.
In October 1998, Hugo Torbet, after passing his carry-on bag
through the x-ray scan and walking through the metal detector
without raising suspicion, was selected for a random, physical
search pursuant to a policy of randomly, hand-searching bags
* Special thanks to Mr. D. Russell Williams, Ms. Cherald E. Kocurek, Ms.
Tracie Dickerson, ProfessorJo Anne Durako, and Dr. W. M. von Zharen, without
whom, this note would not exist.
Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc., 298 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2002).
2 Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc., No. CV-99-12354-AHM (C.D. Cal. 1999).
3 Torbet, 298 F.3d at 1088.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5 United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 502 (2d Cir. 1974) (Oakes,J., concur-
ring) (quoting United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 676 (2d Cir. 1974) (Mansfield,
J., concurring)).
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even if the electronic search raised no suspicion of weapons or
explosives.6 When Mr. Torbet refused to submit to the addi-
tional physical search and asked to leave the airport, Police Of-
ficer Mike Edwards informed him that he was not free to leave
until after the search was completed.7 Eventually, Mr. Torbet's
bag was searched, nothing was discovered, and Mr. Torbet was
allowed to catch his flight."
However, one year after the incident, Torbet, a lawyer, sued
United Airlines, the Board of Airport Commissioners, the City
of Los Angeles, and Officer Edwards, for violating his civil rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy,
and negligence. 9 Torbet challenged the policy of randomly
searching bags that did not arouse suspicion, claiming loss of
dignity and emotional distress as a result, and sought $1,000,000
in damages.1I
In December 2000, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California granted the defendants' motion on
the pleadings noting that random physical searches are author-
ized by the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) confiden-
tial security procedures and that the search is constitutional
because an air traveler "impliedly consent[s] to the search by
placing his bag on the x-ray belt."1 2 The court further con-
cluded that its holding preempted Torbet's state law claims. 13
On appeal, Torbet challenged only the district court's holding
regarding his civil rights claim, arguing that "random post-x-ray
searches are facially invalid, in the absence of express consent,
unless the x-ray scan arouses suspicion."14
The Ninth Circuit relied on a faulty argument to determine
that because the district court found the confidential proce-
dures in place at the time Mr. Torbet was searched reasonable,
the resulting random, physical search was constitutional. The
Ninth Circuit's analysis is based on the presumption that a pas-





I" The court originally ordered production of the security procedures under a
protective order; however, the court later modified that order to allow produc-
tion "under seal, only for the court's in canma review." To date, neither Torbet,
nor his counsel, have been permitted to view the procedures. Id. at 1088-89.
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senger who places his bag on the x-ray conveyor belt consents to
a random, physical search; when in reality, the passenger has
not consented to any search, or alternatively has consented only
to the x-ray search and not the random, physical search.' 5 Fur-
thermore, this circuitous reasoning goes against the Ninth Cir-
cuit's prior holding that "a generalized law enforcement search
of all passengers as a condition for boarding a commercial air-
craft would plainly be unconstitutional." 6
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by stating that "[a] n air-
port screening search is reasonable if: (1) it is no more extensive
or intensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to
detect weapons or explosives; (2) it is confined in good faith to
that purpose; and (3) passengers may avoid the search by elect-
ing not to fly."17 However, the passenger must elect not to fly
"before placing his bag on the x-ray belt," because once the pas-
senger places his bag on the x-ray machine's conveyor belt, the
passenger impliedly consents to the search.'" Furthermore, an
x-ray scan is "inconclusive, justifying further search, even when it
doesn't affirmatively reveal anything suspicious."19 Therefore,
according to the court, because a passenger consents to an x-ray
search of his bag that will never be conclusive, the passenger has
consented to a random, physical search of his belongings, and
thus, that search is constitutional because the passenger con-
sented to the original x-ray search. This reasoning is flawed and
the outcome is a violation of liberty. As the late Justice Brandeis
noted:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to pro-
tect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent...
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. 21
First, a search to detect weapons and explosives cannot be
considered reasonable if it has proven to be completely incapa-
ble of detecting weapons and explosives. In other words, to be
15 Id. at 1088; see also Edwards, 498 F.2d at 505.
16 United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1989)
(citing United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (1973)).
17 Torbet, 298 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Davis, 482 F.2d at 913).
1S Id. (citing United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 901-02 (9th Cir.
1986)). Contra United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 807-08 (2d Cir. 1974)
("Even after activating the magnetometer, the prospective passenger may refuse
to submit to a frisk and instead forfeit his ability to travel by air .
19 Torbet, 298 F.3d at 1089.
20 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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reasonable, "no matter the threat, the search to counter it will
be as limited as possible, consistent with meeting the threat."2'
A search that is inconclusive in 100% of the cases, necessitating
the use of a further search, is not narrowly achieving its end, and
thus, cannot withstand the first prong of the court's test because
it is more extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of cur-
rent technology, to detect weapons or explosives.
Second, the alleged governmental purpose of the search is to
deter passengers from carrying weapons and explosives,22 a
function adequately served by the x-ray scan. The random, phys-
ical search goes beyond that purpose because the so-called se-
curity searches are used as general warrants to search for items
other than weapons and explosives, such as illegal money and
drugs, -3 the scenarios of suspicionless searches the Fourth
Amendment was intended to combat.24 Although deterrence is
a legitimate and substantial governmental purpose, "that pur-
pose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamen-
tal personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved."25 The mandatory x-ray search of every passenger's
carry-on bags narrowly achieves the governmental purpose of
deterring "potential hijackers from even attempting to bring
weapons on a plane. '26 When the x-ray scan arouses suspicion,
due to an indeterminate shadow or outline, probable cause has
been raised and a physical search becomes reasonable.
However, a random, physical search of a passenger's carry-on
bag, following an inconclusive x-ray scan, is not confined to
searching for weapons and explosives because courts hold that
once the bag is opened, other contraband becomes fair game.2 v
In 1974, the Second Circuit recognized the use of x-ray technol-
ogy at security checkpoints as "'inefficient' in that all passengers
are searched, but only a fraction of one percent have weapons,
[yet] up to 50 per cent of the passengers passing through a mag-
21 Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806.
Id. at 807-08.
23 See $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1241 (finding illegal currency); Pu-
lido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d at 901 (finding cocaine); Albarado, 495 F.2d at 801 (find-
ing counterfeit currency).
24 The Framers of the Constitution added the Fourth Amendment to protect
citizens from overzealous constables who would procure general warrants rather
than risk an action for false arrest. See Edwards, 498 F.2d at 503.
25 Davis, 482 F.2d at 912-13 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1961)).
26 Albarado, 495 F.2d at 804.
27 $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1247.
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netometer may activate it."28 The court predicted that, although
the search system was justified originally, it would "eventually re-
main without an actual, existing threat to justify it
degenerat[ing] from the original search for weapons to a gen-
eral search for contraband.""2 9 This is exactly what has hap-
pened. Accordingly, in 1989, the Ninth Circuit refused to justify
an airport screening system that paid security personnel for re-
porting "any sum of currency over $10,000 to the United States
Customs Service and Airport Police,""° noting that:
It is the very ubiquitousness of airport security checks that calls
for the greatest vigilance on our part. Because these checks
touch the lives of so many, because they have become such an
accepted part of our existence, they are capable of great abuse.
Liberty-the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by govern-
ment-is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government of-
ficials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose
purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the
shark.3'
Third, the Ninth Circuit dismisses the impropriety of the
search by flippantly holding that "passengers may avoid the
search by electing not to fly.",32 In the twenty-first century, this is
simply not a viable option. An American citizen should not be
forced to choose between two constitutional rights: the right to
travel 33 and the right to remain free from unreasonable
searches. 4 In 1973, when the Ninth Circuit decided Davis,
there were legitimate alternatives to flying. At that time, flying
was expensive and limited to a small class of people. Today, al-
most thirty years later, "[a]irplane travel has become the life-
blood of American society."35 Furthermore, as noted in Pulido-
Baquerizo, the court in Davis did not draw a line beyond which a
passenger "may decide not to fly and thereby withdraw his im-
plied consent. '36 In fact, the court expressly refrained from
2s Albarado, 495 F.2d at 805.
-' Id. The court noted that "[l]ess than 20 per cent of the arrests resulting
from the anti-hijacking system have been for offenses related to aircraft security."
Id. at 805 n.12.
30 $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1241, 1248.
31 Id. at 1246.
32 Torbet, 298 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Davis, 482 F.2d at 913).
33 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127 (1958) ("Freedom to travel, is indeed, an
important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty."').
34 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
'15 $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1242.
36 Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d at 902 (citing Davis, 482 F.2d at 913).
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drawing that line for thirteen years.37 Yet, the court in Pulido-
Baquerizo drew the line at the time when a passenger places his
bag on the x-ray conveyor belt) 8
In addition, the random nature of the search is suspect. Mod-
ern courts reject the use of racial profiling, and without pub-
lished procedures to ensure that racial profiling is not being
used to determine the "random" passenger, a random, physical
search cannot possibly pass constitutional muster. As the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court noted, detailing the proper process and
scope of the search not only prepares those being searched, but
also "provides a check on those conducting the search not to
exceed their limited authority."39 Even the Second Circuit's
Judge HenryJ. Friendly, while extolling the virtues of the "FAA
anti-hijacking program," admitted that the scope of the search
must be reasonable and the passenger must have been given
"advance notice of his liability to such a search."40 But, knowl-
edge that some search may be conducted is not enough. The
passenger must know the process and scope of the search so that
he can make an informed decision whether to consent.41 Fur-
thermore, unless the passenger has knowledge of the proce-
dure, there is no way to prevent agents from exceeding their
authority and searching for something other than weapons and
explosives.
Finally, even assuming that the search could be found reason-
able, Torbet did not consent to the search, expressly or im-
pliedly, because he neither knew that the procedures allowed
the search nor freely chose to submit to the search. In fact, not
only did Mr. Torbet not consent to a physical search of his carry-
on bag, but also, Mr. Torbet asked to leave the airport and was
detained.42 Consent that waives a constitutional right must be
"freely and voluntarily given; it must not be directly or indirectly
the result of coercion. "4' Forcing a passenger to choose be-
37 Id.; see generally United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1228-32 (9th Cir.
1980) (passing on implied consent); United States v. Homburg, 546 F.2d 1350,
1352-53 (9th Cir. 1976) (refusing to adopt implied consent doctrine).
- Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d at 902.
39 In re F.B., 726 A.2d 361, 366 (Pa. 1999) (considering notice an important
factor in balancing the parties' interests when evaluating constitutionality of a
student search).
40 Edwards, 498 F.2d at 500 (quoting his own opinion in Bell, 464 F.2d at 675).
41 Id.
42 Torbet, 298 F.3d at 1088.
43 Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806.
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tween his right to travel and his right to remain free from unrea-
sonable searches is a form of coercion. 44
[W]e doubt that the government could extract so broad a con-
sent as a condition for boarding an airplane. . . [S] hould the
government decide to screen all passengers on trains, buses or
cars, such a procedure could not be upheld on grounds of im-
plied consent, in the absence of a constitutionally sufficient justi-
fication. Any other conclusion not only offends common sense,
but flies in the face of the most fundamental Fourth Amendment
principle that the government cannot avoid the restrictions of
the Fourth Amendment by notifying the public that all tele-
phone lines would be tapped or that all homes would be
searched.45
Additionally, forcing a passenger to elect not to fly imposes
considerable hardship on passengers who must find alternate
transportation, assuming that there are alternate forms of trans-
portation available. 46' As the Ninth Circuit aptly stated, "[t]he
true voluntariness of an airport search is doubtful in any
event. . . A passenger is not, of course, compelled to travel by
airplane, but many travelers would reasonably conclude that
they had no realistic alternative. " "
No one discounts the tragic events of September 11, 2001, or
the terrorist attacks that preceded them; however, what seems
reasonable in the aftermath of those attacks cannot be used to
justify a search that predated those events by three years.
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a
population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting ter-
ror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of
the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbi-
trary government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and
worked among a people possessed of many admirable qualities
but deprived of these rights to know that the human personality
deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where
homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to un-
heralded search and seizure by the police.4 8
Random, physical searches of carry-on luggage following x-ray
searches that do not arouse suspicion violate the Fourth Amend-
44 Id. at 806-07.
45 $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1247.
4, Albarado, 495 F.2d at 807.
47 $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1248 n.8.
41 Edwards, 498 F.2d at 503 n.2 (Oakes, J., concurring).
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ment of the United States Constitution because a passenger una-
ware of the current procedures, and unable to avoid them,
cannot consent, expressly nor impliedly.
